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MAN AND THE STATE
A PREFACE TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS*
FRITZ MORSTEIN MARXt
THE NATURE OF POLITICAL MAN
Human Need and Human Knowledge. All government
has its ultimate foundation in the needs of man. Foremost
among these, from the standpoint of political organization, are
those needs arising from man's existence as a social being.
Living as he does in association with his kind, he has a funda-
mental interest in the establishment of authority to help him
both in reaping the benefits and meeting the dangers of such
association. If we would understand the problem of govern-
ment, we shall do well to keep in mind the social nature of
man. A purely architectural appreciation of political institu-
tions, or of alternatives of constitutional design, is indicative
of little insight into the problem. The primary fact is that
government everywhere is government by men and for men,
with the number of direct participants and beneficiaries rang-
ing from the few at the one end of the scale to the many at
the other.
In focusing their attention on the social nature of man,
students of politics spare themselves some of the embarrass-
ment of groping their way in the darker regions of the ab-
stract. But they do not escape the enigmatic aspects of
human behavior. Man, individually, is concrete enough.
Moreover, he has generally thought it easy to understand
his own nature, to know what was good for himself, to
recognize what he wanted; consequently, his needs, too, have
a seductive appearance of being at once obvious and .concrete.
But if politics could really be reduced to equations about
people who know their own minds and can judge their own
needs, it would be child's play, not the art and science it is.
As poets like Aeschylus, Shakespeare, and Goethe knew in-
* This article will appear in a forthcoming book, FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENTS: THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICS ABROAD, edited by Professor
Morstein Marx (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York).
J. D. 1922, University of Hamburg, Germany. Lecturer on Politi-
cal Theory, American University, Washington, D. C. Author of
GOVERNMENT IN THE THIRD REICH (rev. ed. 1937); editor of ELE-
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tuitively, long before psychiatric verification was possible,
man has little basis for claiming that he understands his own
personality and his own good. Too often he cannot explain
his actions. Too often he is his own worst enemy.
Comprehension and Emotion. Man's capacity for be-
coming his own worst enemy stems in part from limitations
upon his intellectual perception. His place in the social order
has given rise, through all the ages 6f recorded history, to
questions that his intellect lacked the power to answer with
finality. Of late, moreover, the questions have tended to get
tougher. Modern industrial civilization, supported by the
twin pillars of science and technology, is certainly not the
simplest structure to comprehend. Because scientific and
technical knowledge has pushed ahead at so many points and
in so many different directions, no human mind can hope to
see the total development except in broadest outline; few
minds are good enough even to trace all the outline with
some assurance. The great body of humanity is guided by
crudely simplified versions of what the best minds say they
see. It is thus only too easy for man to become sorely coni-
fused over ends and means.
Moreover, man hears different voices within himself.
The rational ego lives in constant battle with the irrational
ego; nor are the two neatly separated. On the contrary,
mental processes are tightly intertwined with emotional pro-
cesses. As everyone knows, when people are swayed by emo-
tions, their ability to think and act rationally is sharply cur-
tailed if not completely suspended. The extreme testimony
to this fact is mob action, which can turn mature and
ordinarily restrained individuals into hysterical killers. Emo-
tional urges defying self-control have their origin in a great
variety of personal factors, especially in those that cause op-
pressive feelings of insecurity or inadequacy. The triumph
of emotion over reason may also result from an equally
burdensome awareness of the growing insignificance of the
individual in a society of increasingly large-scale organiza-
tion. Broadly speaking, when conscious achievement of pur-
pose is smothered by obstacles, smoldering frustration often
sets off an explosion.
Political Man's Complexity. Although the only truly
concrete element in the structure of government, man there-
fore is not a standard unit in the calculus of politics. Whe-
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ther one likes it or not, it is undoubtedly true that no unduly
simplified concept of man can long survive in political science.
The greatest errors of political theory have had as cause the
oversimplification of human nature. Some thinkers have
built the entire edifice of their theory of government on the
contention that man is essentially evil. Others have reversed
this position, insisting that man is essentially good. What-
ever the criteria of good or evil, today the psychologist is
rare who would tie himself to either alternative.
Discomforting though it may be, the sounder view is at
the same time less categorical. Man is both good and bad,
both wise and foolish, both courageous and timid, both strong
and weak; and, as the primary factor in politics, he trans-
mits to the latter his own problematic nature by showing
in his individual conduct all these characteristics in varying
degrees. Complicated rather than simple, he is not seldom
baffled by his inability to predict his own behavior. It is
therefore obvious that the generalizations of political science
must be framed in recognition of the quicksand nature of
human motivation.1
Political man has done and will continue to do many
strange things. To mention but a few within the range of
our immediate experience: He has persistently voiced a
preference for as little government as possible, yet has not
found it incongruous to exert steady pressure for an expan-
sion of governmental protection and assistance. He has
come to admit the appalling risk of an uncontrolled business
cycle, yet has been very slow to dismiss his strong mental
reservations toward governmental planning to avert this
risk. In hours of exaltation, he has seen the glory of popular
rule and acknowledged it as a grand venture in cooperation,
yet more often he has cursed government as a scheming
agent of interference. He has not remained ignorant of the
uncounted ways in which the modern service state sustains
the national economy, yet his most familiar nightmare has
been the vision of a despotic bureaucracy feasting on the
fruits of the people's toil like a swarm of locusts. The fact
that there is no familiar cartoon figure portraying govern-
1. Two extraordinarily illuminating documents are THE DAIms OF
FRANK KAFKA, 1910-1913 (Max Brod ed. 1948) and THE JouR-
NALS OF ANDRE GIDe, 1914-1927 (Vol. II, Justin O'Brien's trans.
1948). These books are an eloquent record of man's struggle with
himself,
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ment as a source of benefits or services further illuminates
this complicated rather than simple nature of political man.2
Abstract Man's Trickery. A heroic interpretation of
history would find most of its raw material in particular
personalities. Political science, on the other hand, deals in
the main with the behavior of large numbers of people and
so must necessarily place great emphasis upon man in gen-
eral. Man in particular is concrete, but man in general is
always abstract. In fact, so much of an abstraction is ab-
stract man that he has never been met, engaged in conversa-
tion, or interviewed. He was not born, nor does he die; he
lives as an immortal figment of statistics. In him we have
a convenient symbol that is supposed to furnish some idea
of what most of us are thinking and doing or are likely to
think and do next.
In examining abstract man, we are confronting the con-
formities of social life, which have a tendency to mask in-
dividual characteristics and so inevitably fail in many ways
to indicate accurately what particular men are actually
thinking and doing or are likely to think and do next. Ab-
stract man, therefore, may claim for himself more considera-
tion than he is justly entitled to receive: there is always the
question of for precisely how many of us he has a right to
speak. Unless we are careful he may trick us by his quanti-
tative pretenses. We must correct his exaggerations. We
must watch him closely. We must doubt him often.
POLITICAL MAN AS ORGANIZED MAN
Man under Government. We have seen, then, that to
live as a social being is an expression of the nature of man.
At bottom, all society is both part and product of man's
social nature. In the social organization and in the processes
of social life around him, he always meets in some measure
his own social self, or, more specifically, he meets the insti-
tutional embodiment of the social nature and needs of his
kind.
Because man is a social being, he is also a political
being, for in seeking a mode of life satisfying to his social
nature, he is forced to create a system of authority that will
2. To borrow a point from H. D. LASSWELM, POLITICS: WHO GETS
.WHAT, WHEN, How 37 (1936).
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provide him with at least the rudimentary elements of law
and order. In doing so, however, he also creates a dilemma,
and one that he has never been able to solve. It exists in
the possibility that any system of authority he sets up may
-evade his control-that is, the control exerted in common
by the great body of men. When that happens, and to the
extent to which it happens, political power usually becomes
an instrument of exploitation used in the interest of the
few to the disadvantage of the many. Social man needs
government sorely; but in equal measure he needs to exert
enough control over it to keep it in his service and to pre-
vent it from being turned against him. These needs make
social man political man.
It is thus evident that political man cannot be thought
of as belonging to a functional or occupational category-
as does the policeman, the meteorologist, or the businessman.
In particular, political man is not one whose paid job it is
to handle political affairs. There have always been govern-
mental functionaries--lawmakers, diplomats, soldiers, admin-
istrative officials, judges-but these political man likes to
denounce as politicians, or bureaucrats, or brass hats.
Typically, he suspects the motives of any expert in politics
and takes pride in his low opinion of the breed. Political
man is political not by occupation, but because he lives under
government.
Foundations of Political Organization. Society is formed
and constantly reinforced by the social behavior of its mem-
bers. In the same way, government, as the basic structure
of authority within the social order, draws its vitality from
the political initiative and response of the great mass of
men. Consequently, since government is capable of touching
him at any time and in a number of ways, each individual
is a political being, at least in a passive sense. In order to
be consciously effective as a political being, however, he must
accept his part in the political process. As political man, he
is called upon to assume the burdens of politically organized
man.
In one sense, political man is organized man independent
of personal civic effort on his part, by virtue of his status
as a compulsory member of any particular nation-state. For
the consequences of this status, it does not matter whether
he happens to exercise the privileges of a free citizen or
['Vol. 24
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whether he trudges along under the heavy load of duties as-
signed to a mere subject without effective rights. But in
either case his national status is that of organized man,
since for all practical purposes he is unable to strip it off.
Compulsion of National Status. Under the auspices of
the modern state, the organizational implications of govern-
ment for the life of everyone have steadily unfolded. At the
same time, the condition of the intentionally or unintention-
ally stateless individual has been made ever more precarious.
To a striking degree- the state today has become what a
philosopher of individualism once decried it as being, "an
imposed fate." It is a fate that has engaged millions of
common folk, eager to live in peace, in the cataclysmic wars
of the twentieth century.
To most of us, the compulsory nature of the organization
that goes with nationality is so obvious as to appear com-
pletely normal. It is true that if one starts with the premise
of personal freedom, the exact opposite-mobility at pleasure
-might more appropriately be considered normal. But how
is any individual to engineer his escape from the state? Even
though he were suited for a solitary existence, he still has
only a small chance of remaining undisturbed in whatever
backwoods he may retire to. However well-hidden his lair,
he is likely to be tracked down by such agents of government
as the tax colector, the sanitation officer, the draft board,
the census taker, the security investigator, and the fire guard.
This annoyance is yet little compared with the virtual im-
possibility of slipping out from under one sovereignity and
quietly assuming allegiance to another. Passports and visas
may be withheld in the exercise of discretionary power. Emi-
gration and immigration proceed through barely opened doors
and require elaborate certificates and permits, issued or re-
fused by administrative agencies in the light of circum-
stances.
Conscious Self-Organization. If, on the other hand, the
individual sees no reason to shun his community or to flee
his government; if he is ready to meet at least his basic
civic obligations; if he is even eager for an active part in
political life-under these conditions, his first task is one of
reflection. He must himself clearly recognize the full signifi-
cance of his status as politically organized man. This he
will be able to do only by seeking an understanding of the
19481
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essence of citizenship. Next he must adjust his political
behavior to the rules of conduct emanating from such an
understanding.8 In no other way can he organize himself
for his role as political man. If he does not attain this
understanding, if he does not undertake this self-organization,
he cannot hope to make himself felt politically. On the con-
trary, he is likely to dissipate his civic efforts, to despair
of his contribution as a member of the community, and to
take eventual refuge in the wholly negative attitudes of the
uncooperative grumbler.
But although political man is organized in either a pas-
sive or an active sense, even his most active political self-
expression does not claim him fully. As a rule, he is orga-
nized politically only in part, and to varying degrees. Of
course, as long as he fails to understand his civic role, he
is always only partly organized; on each occasion on which
the necessity arises, he has to be talked into filling his
place in the ranks or into taking on particular chores.
Interfering Factors. But political man appears only
partly organized for still other reasons. Even when he
consciously accepts his role in the community, he repeatedly
breaks with his organized self-in most instances when ir-
resistibly driven by the irrational forces within himself.
Prejudice, fear, hatred, or mere inertia sometimes overwhelm
his reason; his emotional response sweeps him along, away
from such standards of judgment as he would ordinarily
respect in appraising political issues. To this extent, and
for so long as such conditions exist, he may be said to dis-
organize himself as political man. Needless to say, the
limits on his insight and his knowledge are bound to have
the same effect.
No less important an interfering factor is the circum-
stance that political man is organized in more than one
manner. The primary organization-that from which his
status as a national is derived-competes with other organi-
zations for his attention and cooperation. The laiter organi-
zations are nearly all inferior in power and size to the basic
type provided by the nation-state, but they may have a pri-
mary appeal to the minds of their members. Political man
thus finds himself torn between the conflicting claims of
3. For an outstanding exposition of this need, see JOHN DEWEY, THE
PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927, reissued, 1946).
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many organizations devoted to special causes and interests.
His involvement in these is largely voluntary. He may choose
to be a member of a labor union or of an employer associa-
tion; he may belong to an organized farm group or be tied
in with such other special interests as mining, shipping, or
food distribution. He may think of himself primarily as a
consumer and in consequence give most of his free time to a
consumer organization. He may be principally active as a
member of a church, a professional organization, or an asso-
ciation for the advancement or care of particular groups of
the population.
Such activities may deepen political man's civic sense.
All too often, however, they restrict his perspective and
weaken his concern with the general interest.4
Effect of Personal Interests. Finally, man is a politically
organized being in part only precisely because citizenship is
not a gainful occupation. He must earn his living elsewhere.
His full-time job is in the factory, on the farm, in the office,
in the store. As a consequence, his activity as a citizen can
be at best only a part-time business.
In addition, there is the matter of personal preference.
In some ways, social man likes to be entirely nonpolitical;
in some ways, entirely private. He has a family, friends,
neighbors, and wider social circles devoted to fun and play
or even to enlightenment. There are times when he doesn't
care at all for public affairs; when his personal worries
have a monopoly on his mind; or when his private affairs
run along so splendidly that he is reluctant to do anything
but enjoy himself. At such times, his part-time concern as
a citizen may reach a completely inactive state.
Variables of Political Behavior. All these variables of
motivation, interest, ability, and circumstance give man's
political conduct characteristics of great diversity. For the
political scientist, therefore, the propriety of generalization
comes to depend upon imaginative and sophisticated analysis
made simultaneously at many different points, inasmuch as
individual governmental institutions as well as the entire
4. For a general introduction to the pattern of multiple allegiances
arising from the structure of associations within contemporary
society, see C. E. MERRIAM, THE MAKING OF CITIZENS (1931). This
book provides a broad summary of findings arrived at in a series




political process are subject to many subtle changes that
fail to strike the eye at first glance.
For example, although the constitutional allocation of
power and the structure of government remain exactly the
same, shifts in civic morale may produce a vastly different
degree of political unity and public spirit. When large
masses of people succumb to apathy or hopelessness, a corre-
sponding change is felt in the pulse of politics. Conversely,
when crisis shakes up a nation, the spreading awareness of
peril and simultaneous evidence of leadership may combine
to arouse political man to vigorous civic action. He may
wholeheartedly subordinate his private interests to public
needs. He may be eager to contribute his leisure hours to
community service. He may even clamor for a chance to
offer tangible sacrifices for the common good.5
Impact on Political Life. These variables of behavior-
especially the fluctuations in the extent to which man makes
himself felt as a politically organized being-introduce a
considerable element of change into public life, national or
local. Not surprisingly, the spirit of civic participation and
the operative rhythm of government in the United States,
for example, have been quite different at different times.
They were of one kind in the gloom of economic disintegra-
tion in 1932; of quite another in the early glow of the New
Deal in 1933. Again, they were of one kind at the height
of the war effort in 1944, but of another in the postwar un-
certainties of 1946. Or, to take an example in the municipal
sphere: The temper of a local community may be one thing
in the stagnant condition of boss rule, but quite another
after a successful campaign for the council-manager plan has
been undertaken.
On the same grounds, one can establish distinctions in
the inner strength of any other country at different points in
its history. Such a line of inquiry would go far to explain why
France collapsed under Hitler's assault, while England stood
up under an equally severe test. The historic fact that Eng-
land did meet this test, however, says little about her capacity
for living through a comparable ordeal some other day. No
people is consistent with itself all the time. Each shows
5. Except in the ILIAD, the interplay of motives under conditions of
common strain has been depicted nowhere more memorably than
in LEO TOLSTOY'S WAR AND PEACE.
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measurable variations in its vital processes. Political man
functions in constantly changing degrees of intensity or in-
difference.
Self-Organization and Political Theory. In the first and
most necessary instance, political man organizes himself by
gaining an understanding of his own role in the community.
There are of course more formal methods of self-organiza-
tion. For instance, the citizen registers for voting pur-
poses; works as a member of a political party getting out the
vote on election day; enrolls in a nonpartisan campaign to
build support for a civic program. But none of these specific
activities can mean much unless political man first succeeds
in defining in his own mind what government is entitled
to demand of him and what he may demand of government.
This matter is one of ideas, not of membership cards.
In order to provide a framework within which man can find
place both for the structure of authority and himself, such
ideas must be capable of linking up with one another to
form a working theory of government. Purely as an in-
tellectual edifice, a theory of government has little general
appeal. Typically, its architect is a political philosopher,
whose blueprints are seldom widely read. But popular ver-
sions of his thought may gain sufficient circulation to be
acted upon at a strategic moment. All government rests
on theories. Even in its most erratic manifestations, politi-
cal practice bears some relation to precepts of theory. More-
over, most men of practical affairs, though they sometimes
like to affirm the opposite view, make a success of what
they are doing only because they have a definite mental
orientation toward their work-that is, are guided by a
theory.
In the market place of public affairs, political ideas
have currency mainly in the form of a crude type of short-
hand; they are handed about as images, symbols, or slogans.
However inadequate intellectually as a substitute for full-
bodied ideas, the political images men carry in their heads,
the symbols and slogans to which they respond, do exert a
controlling influence over their actions. Political conduct is,
therefore, in large part a reflection of political ideas. The
latter aid man in visualizing the political structure and the
political process; in determining his own share in affecting
both; and in working out for himself a point of view and a
19481
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practical approach toward citizenship. In all these respects,
he acts upon ideas about government, fragmentary or com-
prehensive, simple or elaborate. In organizing himself as a
citizen, he relies heavily on. those ideas he has learned to
accept as basic in any explanation of what the relationship
between man and authority ought to be.
IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND REALITIES
Ideas as Institutional Supports. Ideas do not live in a
vacuum. They express themselves through institutions.
Ideas endow institutions with a purpose; generate an institu-
tional will, as it were; and, by the directive force of this
institutional will, govern the general operation of the institu-
tion. Ideas equip institutions with defensive armor, keep-
ing intact the institutional rationale; or, conversely, they
spearhead the attack of change on institutional purpose. But
in all the instances in which they play an active role in rela-
tion to the institutional structure, social, economic, or politi-
cal, ideas have to cob'tend with what man accepts as the
given realities of his condition.
Thus, a selective process is at work whose outcome deter-
mines the survival, of particular ideas. Some ideas may soar
to lofty heights but never find a place in man's mind be-
cause they fail to tally with the fundamental facts of his
experience. Although experience is not stationary, it refers
our sense of reality to the familiar and rejects the un-
familiar. It follows that ideas in harmony with a status quo
usually have wider appeal than ideas running counter to it
-unless the status quo is disintegrating. For example, a
property system based on individual gain will keep itself
surrounded by a cluster of ideas arguing the benefits of
the system, but will at the same time supply an inhospitable
soil for the growth of ideas stressing the collective use of
property. Conversely, ideas about personal liberty, even
when officially promoted, may never take hold if the govern-
ment at the same time contradicts its words about individual
freedom by its practice.
In brief, a close relationship exists between ideas, insti-
tutions, and realities. The relationship is so intimate that
it seems foolish to raise the question once asked of the late
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, "What is more im-
[VCol. 24
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portant, ideas or things?" His answer was very much to
the point--Why, I should imagine ideas about things."
Perhaps one might amplify the answer by giving first place
to ideas about things that relate to man's experience.
Ideas as Unified Frame of Reference. It is significant
that the most enduring ideas about the place of man under
government have been those of comprehensive sweep, of
bold vision, of inner coherence. Political ideas likely to
impress themselves upon man's mind are ideas integrated in
a system, ideas that make sense in relation to one another.
The need for system in political theory can probably be
best appreciated when one considers the all-pervasive effects
of the structure of political authority. Living under this
structure is man, who is at once parent, worker, neighbor,
and citizen, all in the same frame of ideas. This frame of
ideas must show a high degree of unity if it is to serve him
adequately.
Political theory may confine itself to an explanation of
the organization and uses of power in a particular setting.
Or it may set out on the more ambitious undertaking of
demonstrating generally the essential features of the best
kind of government as the ideal type. In either case, an inte-
grated body of ideas is alone adequate for the purpose. The
point of departure, of course, is man-man wanting to be
hmiself individually as well as socially. In order to be him-
self, he needs safeguards against intrusions on his peace,
freedom for his self-development, and justice to prevent
abuse. Government, which extends these guaranties to him,
is therefore a principal factor in his scheme of values, and
consequently becomes part of the ordered universe in which
man seeks his own purpose. His concern with a purposeful
universe, as it is carried over into politics, leads him to look
for a broadly inclusive system of political values.
Ideas as Moral Law. Concern with values is the core of
all political theory. The logic of human action centers upon
this core. Because man, as a political being, sooner or later
learns that he gets nowhere by aimlessly pushing or being
pushed about, he seeks a working formula of politics by
which to go. Because such a working formula is apt to let
him down if it is just a jumbled assortment of unrelated
particulars, he gropes for some systematic theory of govern-
19481
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ment. But in formulating such a theory, he needs a guide,
not only to what is, but also to what ought to be.
Merely to know politics in an empirical way is not suf-
ficient. Any definition of citizenship, for example, implies
that there is in general reasonable certainty about what a good
citizen should and should not do. In other words, the
question of the moral law in politics is broached. In order
to answer it, political theory must commit itself on its order
of values, on things good and things evil.
In formulating its system of values, political theory is
bound to encounter other systems. To begin with the most
obvious, there is the system of values put forth by religious
faith, usually the most highly developed. But primitive
superstition, too, boasts some system of values; and any
body of personal ethics autonomously conceived, even that
of the agnostic or the atheist, represents a value system. This
coexistence of different systems of values raises important
questions of interrelation.
Interrelations of Value Systems. Acknowledgment of
God's order as the order of the universe reduces any system
of political values to a subordinate place. No system of poli-
tical values, on this basis, could be thought of as departing
from the harmony inherent in God's order. On the contrary,
political values could be only an elaboration of religious
values. Of course, on the premise of compatibility, religion
may take a relatively neutral attitude toward the value sys-
tem of politics; this situation is particularly likely to occur
when religion is no longer a strongly effective force in society.
But even under such conditions, the air of neutrality could
not be maintained if the value order of politics appeared to
challenge the religious system of values in any significant
respect.
If fundamental breaks occur between the religious and
the political system of values, continuous conflict is inevitable.
Such conflict would tear into the very heart of man's basic
allegiance. 6 If he follows the voice of religion, he must
sharply reject the irreconcilable counterclaims of politics. If
6. The position of a leader of Protestant theology is set forth with
great distinction in REINHOLD NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OFMAN (1941); that of an equally outstanding Catholic philosopher
in JACQUES MARITAIN, SCHOLASTICISM AND POLITICS (Mortimer
Adler ed. 1940) and CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY (Anson's trans.
1944).
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he takes the opposite side, he will come to turn away either
from religion or from those who speak for it. The attitude
of the Holy See toward Marxist communism is a clear illustra-
tion of -the fundamental conflict that may rise between a
religious and a political value system.
The same alternative is offered when the place of the
value system of religion is taken by one of personal ethics
independent of religious faith. But a greater risk is faced
by the rebel who, for reasons springing from his personal
ethics, defies the prevailing system of political values. He
usually must meet the consequences of such defiance without
the comfort of institutional support.
Another condition results from the revolutionary or
evolutionary ascendancy of systems of political values in
periods of declining religious vigor or progressive moral
confusion. Such tendencies have long been in evidence. As
man's moral vision of a divine order has grown dim, the
waning strength of religion has left him either to flounder
unsupported or to put his faith in various secular prescrip-
tions. One such prescription is a naYve pseudo-religion of
science claiming cultish deference for every scientific finding,
a position that is anathema to true science, as leaders of
science have pointed out frequently. At another extreme,
unchallenged primacy has been claimed for a system of politi-
cal values consolidated into an all-embracing ideology.
In this last case, political theory in actual fact trans-
forms itself into a secular religion. It will insist upon settling
all issues of right or wrong on its own terms. It will present
itself as the sole foundation of all morality, arguing that all
morality at its source is identical with political morality.
Indeed, on this premise, a political ideology may be able to
ally itself with a dependent religion, as the relationship be-
tween the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church indi-
cates. It is evident that the rank claimed for political theory
among the systems of values that influence man's choice is
a fundamental factor in distinguishing among different sys-
tems of government.
Harmony of Political Values. A political system, then,
though presenting itself in a set of institutions, is at bottom
an enactment of values and ideas. It is truly a political sys-
tem in exact proportion to the support it commands from a
systematic body of ideas grounded in an order of values.
1948]
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This does not mean that either the body of ideas or the under-
lying value system must be original or pure, underived or
unmixed. It does mean that both the ideas, however ex-
tensively blended, and the values, however heterogeneous by.
pedigree, must be integrated. They must form, or be sus-
ceptible of being considered to form, a harmonious whole.
For example: The value of individual liberty cannot
be reconciled with the diametrically opposite value of un-
conditional obedience demanded in the interest of maximum
political strength. Personal freedom can be reconciled, how-
ever, with the different value of the general welfare. The
value of liberty, in turn, correlates with maxims of political
theory. One such maxim is that authority must always be
held in check. This maxim cannot, of course, be applied
in conjunction with the opposite maxim that the ordained
supreme leader is always right. But the maxim that author-
ity must always be kept in check does not conflict with the
different maxim that lawful acts of authority warrant com-
pliance. Furthermore, the value of freedom and the maxim
of checked authority jointly affect the practical alternatives
on the level of institutional- arrangements. Both value and
maxim jointly sustain a division of authority into separate
branches, legislative, executive, and judicial. Both reject as
incompatible a structure of authority combining these three
powers into one political organ. On the other hand, the
institutional arrangement of divided powers may be combined
with arrangements for needed cooperation between the dif-
ferent political organs.
Role of Ideology. The interrelated values and maxims
of political theory lend a strong weight of justification and
propriety to the political institutions they support. Political
institutions so supported acquire self-evident merit in the
eyes of those who are consciously or unconsciously permeated
by those same underlying values and maxims. Simultan-
eously, however, political theory also provides standards of
general accountability for institutional performance. For
example, an American newspaper editorial, say, may blast a
legislature for giving consideration to an undemocratic meas-
ure. Even if practicable in a narrow sense, the measure
would still be open to attack as being in conflict with demo-
cratic political theory. In the British phrase, such a pro-
posal is something that politically "isn't done." Conversely,
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criticism may be aimed at the failure of a governmental
agency to do what on grounds of ideology it is under an
obligation to do. A constitution, or its integral political
institutions, may become lifeless unless constantly animated
by its spirit-the ideas that gave it rise and give it meaning.
It is thus only too plain that no political system can
afford to be indifferent toward its own ideology. Nor can it
safely be casual about emerging challenges, whether these
challenges come to the fore in the guise of ideas or of realities.
Yet ideologies differ in their methods of meeting such chal-
lenges. An ideology that is in effect a secular religion will
claim the right to respond with repressive countermeasures.
This claim may go so far as to entail a police system of
thought control. Another ideology will accept the chal-
lenge and gain from it an incentive to increase the effective-
ness of institutional performance.
Ideological Deception. Of course, one must not leave
out of account man's innate capacity for illusion. Political
theory may hand him rose-colored glasses, and he may grow
so fond of the pretty picture they present that he forgets
the lessons of his drab day-by-day experience.
An ideology may, for example, promote the belief that
anyone through just hard work can reach the highest rungs
of the social ladder, thus assigning to government a generally
passive role. The illusion of unobstructed opportunity is
not necessarily harmed by dry statistics to the contrary. Yet
there is such a thing as a law of diminishing ideological re-
turns-at least in the longer run.
"In the longer run, disparity between the assertion and
the reality is likely to cast doubts upon the ideology itself.
Advocates of political change have therefore always faced
an ugly dilemma. If they boldly conjured up an idealized
goal, its inspirational appeal might provide a powerful initial
boost, but the discrepancy between it and hard facts would
later cause trouble. On the other hand, a sober statement
of realistically defined objectives, though more easily attain-
able in the light of experience, would fail to stir up mass
emotion. The art of statesmanship consists in striking the
best balance possible between the two.
Adaptation of Ideology. All ideology has its own propa-
ganda, acknowledged or unacknowledged. The basic political
values are deliberately taught-in the schools, in the press,
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over the radio, in youth organizations, in political parties-
by all forms of government. At the same time, such changes
as stem from the dynamics of social or economic development
have continuously to be accommodated in the given ideologi-
cal framework. Ability to accomplish such accommodation
is perhaps the cardinal test in the survival of an ideology.
This last point brings up the question of who is to func-
tion as the caretaker of the ideology. One could think of
different possibilities-a designated body, a recognized elite,
a formal majority, a continuing consensus freely sought.
Once more, in the choice among these alternatives, one is
made aware of a sharp distinction between systems of gov-
ernment. Democratic government would reject as incom-
patible with itself any form of minority control over its
ideology. It would hesitate to take too great stock in a for-
mal majority-except in an exceedingly stable one. Demo-
cratic government would accomplish ideological adaptation
in the gradual consolidation of a popular consensus. In
direct contrast, totalitarianism settles such problems by pro-
nouncement of the leader.
THE VALUE OF COMPARISON
This antithesis of approach indicates the advisability of
scrutinizing the terrain of politics from as many different
vantage points as are accessible, and one of the best vantage
points is that gained in comparative study. If, by compara-
tive study, we place side by side different systems of gov-
ernment or, as integral parts of such systems, different -insti-
tutions that serve the same political purpose, we do much to
extend and round out our knowledge of politics. Compara-
tive study of government is nothing new. It had its first
boom many centuries ago. Aristotle, considered by many
the father of political science, gave the comparative approach
a central place in his methodology. Dissatisfied with Plato's
freely roaming speculative reasoning, he instructed the
students gathered about him in the Lyceum in the discipline
of empirical research. This discipline brought forth a sub-
stantial collection of case studies dealing with the political
organization of individual Greek city-states, exemplified by
the surviving Constitution of Athens.
Such investigation of comparable institutions and dis-
[Vol. 24
MAN AND THE STATE
passionate comparison of findings widened the field of in-
tellectual vision, made established facts more meaningful,
encouraged a systematic grouping of all that was known, and
so made possible a theory of government subject to the test
of observation. Since Aristotle's day these advantages have
been sufficiently obvious to commend the comparative method
to students of government, not excepting those who were
unable or were disinclined to equal Aristotle's scientific zeal.
In his Prince, Machiavelli bolstered shrewd advice to Italy's
statesmen with telling references to the wisdom and folly
of rulers in other times and places. Harrington reinforced
the tenor of his Oceana with evidence drawn from the politi-
cal practices of various nations, ancient and contemporary.
Montesquieu derived some of the most influential ideas in
his Spirit of the Laws, especially that of the separation of
powers, from the comparison of different political systems.
Rarely affected by the feuds between different schools of
thought, comparative study of government has outlived pass-
ing methodological fashions.
Extension of Comparability. When most of the world
moves in the same general direction, especially in economic
development, comparative study of politics extends its area.
An isolated social system may present particular lessons-
for example, the tribal.way of life of the Hopi Indian could
teach metropolitan man much about the avoidance of con-
flict. But Hopi governance offers few significant parallels
to the manner in which the political institutions of a pro-
gressively urbanized society function. This society is pri-
marily industrial. The industrial revolution has been a great
equalizer of continents and regions; together with the drive
for foreign markets, the sweeping advances of a scientific
and technological character made during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries have fostered the establishment of a
world-wide minimum standard of existence. This standard
is acknowledged in every part of the globe, if only for the
purpose of measuring relative local inadequacies.
Notwithstanding differences in national economic levels,
large masses of people in many different countries live in
about the same way, share about the same material values,
and enjoy about the same basic amenities of life; were it not
for the destructions of World War II, these masses would
be even larger than they are. Productive resources in most
of the world are harnessed in approximately the same tech-
nical manner and under similar legal forms. Where the
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economy has remained predominantly agrarian, pressure for
native industries has been rising: the equalizer continues to
be active. In the twentieth century, more human beings go
through their day in roughly the same way than at any time
since man left the cave.
These uniformities in the general mode of living have
been multiplied by wider contact, which, in turn, is the result
of the rapid shrinkage of distance. In 1790, it took six
wearying days to travel, by stagecoach, from Boston to New
York. In less time, the modern traveler, whether or not he
gains anything by the rush, can comfortably circle the globe
by plane; and we are far from having reached the practical
limits of speed in ordinary air transport. When Karl Marx
wrote his Capital, the prognostications he made had immed-
iate meaning only for a few industrial countries. One cen-
tury later, the problems of industrial society are written
all over the political structure and processes of the modern
nation-state.
Common Features of Government. The common impact
of these problems becomes evident as soon as one considers
some of the most characteristic features of contemporary
government. In little more than two generations, all the
highly developed countries have witnessed an extraordinary
growth in government functions, especially in such critical
fields as those of economic regulation, employer-employee
relations, and public welfare or social insurance. Progressive
extension of governmental responsibility has carried with it
a corresponding expansion and increase in the number of
administrative agencies. Because governmental machinery
for the handling of administrative business has become so
much larger, proportionately greater political importance has
accrued to the executive branch. The increasing importance
of the latter derives essentially from its power of control
over administrative operations coupled with its competence
for policy coordination: thus can be met the problem of in-
corporating far-flung regulatory and service operations into
coherent programs related to the needs of the economy. To
attend to these needs is not usurpation; hence, the recent
spread in the relative ascendancy of the executive branch
has not ushered in any general decline of legislative control.
Rather, legislative determination has been raised to a higher
and more consequential plane. Yet it is clear that a common
feature of government today is the administrative nature of
the quantitative bulk of government.
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In the economic sphere, the sensitivity of industrial pro-
duction to fluctuations in markets and purchasing power
has made unemployment a terrifying prospect to large por-
tions of mankind. They therefore yearn for "full employ-
ment." This widespread yearning has drawn forth equally
widespread governmental commitments to counter depressions
through appropriate action based on constant and continuing
economic diagnosis.
Still larger portions of mankind have faced, more than
once during their lives, the horror of war. Their anxious
quest for security against aggression has translated itself
not only into heavy defense budgets but also into public
obligations of military training and service, as well as into
a noteworthy range of governmental restraints upon private
action for security reasons.
Finally, government everywhere has come to take a much
greater interest in both the formation and the expression of
public opinion, a development that has led to differing de-
grees of governmental influence in the operation of various
means of communication, such as broadcasting. It has also
led to technical arrangements by which chief executives and
other political leaders are enabled to reach national audiences
of record size. Another result has been a proliferation of
informational services rendered by government departments.
Within proper restraining limits, government comes closer
to the people by playing an active rather than a passive part
in the crystallization of public opinion. In its extreme form,
such activity has encompassed an integrated system of propa-
ganda directed by political officers.
Comparison and Imitation. Perhaps it should be em-
phasized that comparative study of politics has only one
legitimate goal-to advance knowledge. Its ability to attain
this goal is due to the fact that what is treated as common-
place or is habitually confined to a particular meaning in
the governmental experience of one country usually has a
deeper significance when looked at afresh against the back-
ground of political institutions in other countries. Such
fresh examination in a wider frame of reference is always a
broadening influence. It guards against the errors of near-
sightedness. It extends the range of observation by adding
another dimension, as it were.'
7. This point is well illustrated by such a broadly conceived compara-
tive treatise as that of C. J. FRIEDRICH, CoNsTITUTIONIAL GovERN-
MENT AND DEMOCRACY (1941).
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Comparative analysis, on the other hand, does not have
as its guiding principle the assumption that there is one best
way of government, which when discovered, is to be adopted
everywhere. Advocates of wholesale imitation would find
little comfort in comparative study, for one point it makes
plain is the limited practicability of transferring the fruits
of political ingenuity from one country to another. But
one country's example of success or failure may provide
others with welcome experience or specific pointers to be
applied discriminatingly to their own affairs. These are the
very grounds on which Mr. Justice Brandeis rested his
praise of the experimental potentialities of federalism.
Current Benefits of Comparative Analysis. Moreover,
in an era in which the decisive influence of the United States
in world affairs has become a momentous fact, it should
be easy for Americans to see the larger practical value of
comparative politics. It is now a matter of grave importance
that we raise our eyes from the domestic scene long enough
to learn as much as we can about the political characteristics
and tendencies of other countries. Only such knowledge can
bring into being the kind of informed public opinion that
is needed.to make possible and to maintain a wisely conceived
American foreign policy.
Most of the factors that exert a controlling influence
on .international affairs are factors arising from national
need or national self-interest, real or imagined. The in-
dividual's response to either is affected by the political ways
and governmental traditions of his nation. In turn, how-
ever, the individual affects these national ways and tradi-
tions. Here, once more, we come face to face with vast
throngs of human beings-contented, miserable, boastful,
desperate, callous, frenzied. They crowd the stage of politics,
milling about legislatures, executive offices, and courts of
law. The more prominence comparative study succeeds in
giving to the human element, the less danger there is that
it will end up in a meaningless comparison of empty form
and ossified ritual. Like all social sciences, political science
can be truly scientific only to the degree in which it con-
tributes to creation of a science of man.8
8. An indication of the extent to which this point of view is becoming
common may be found in some of the more recent general treat-
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